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Environmental offsets and other market approaches with 








Biodiversity offsets for a river create the incentive for cooperation amongst 
stakeholders with benefits to the environment. Because of the isolation paradox 
supporting institutions need to be created to facilitate cooperation. Environmental 
pollution caused by mining activity is a problem in the Olifants River (East) in South 
Africa. The catchment surface is fractured by mining activities and water is drained 
into underground aquifers, after which it seeps into streams. Mines have been 
permitted to release nutrients in the streams during periods of high flow, which is 
called the “controlled release scheme”. A main problem is the effluent leakage from old 
disused mines during times when river flow is low and not sufficient dilution of 
nutrients is possible. DWAF (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry) has accepted 
ownership of these mines but they may not have the technology (which is expensive) to 
desalinate the effluent. In an offsetting arrangement, incentives can be provided to 
existing mines to desalinate water from these defunct mines by allowing them to 
discharge a given amount in the Olifants when the water flow is sufficiently high. The 
above arrangement will cost the taxpayer nothing while discharge during low flow 
periods is reduced. A discussion was held with stakeholders of the Olifants River 
Forum during 2006 and support was received for some of these policy options. It is 
shown how offsets can mitigate negative effects of dam construction. It is further 
proposed that tradable pollution permits be adopted which are subject to a rule that 
discharges in the river are only allowed when flow is sufficiently high and that trades 
may only occur within certain parameters. 
 




Pollution in South African rivers is a concern and this issue has been a national 
news item in recent times. In spite of its importance it is not always clear how 
it should be tackled. In this contribution the emphasis is on market approaches 
and the involvement of stakeholders. Some aspects of environmental pollution 
will be studied in the Olifants River (East), with a view to suggest policy 
options and brief comments will be made about the Berg River in the Western 
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Cape. The Olifants River rises to the east of Johannesburg and flows north-east 
through the provinces of Mpumalanga and Limpopo into Mozambique. 
Approximately 3.4 million people live in the Olifants River Catchment and a 
considerable proportion of South Africa’s mining, power generation and 
agricultural activities are concentrated here (McCartney et al., 2004). The 
catchment also encompasses important tourist destinations (such as the 
Kruger National Park). It is estimated that activities within the Olifants River 
Water Management Area (WMA) generate 6% of the GDP of South Africa. 
 
The urban population in the Berg River WMA is estimated at 3.5 million. 
About 12% of the GDP of South Africa originates from the Berg WMA. The 
fruit farming sector in the Western Cape is highly labour intensive and 
provides livelihoods to many. Pollution problems in the Berg River are less 
severe than two years ago, but if it is not brought under control, South Africa’s 
fruit and vegetable exports to the EU and USA would be at risk (Myburgh, 
2007). 
 
The Loskop Dam in the Olifants River Catchment is the centre of the coal 
mining and power generation industries (Eskom) in South Africa. These 
industries generate saline effluent, part of which is discharged into the river 
system. According to Van Stryp (2006) pollution is bad while several mining 
operations are currently technically breaking the law due to the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry’s (DWAF’s) lack of capacity to enforce quality 
standards (Lodewijks, 2006). Water quality deteriorates if the level of Loskop 
Dam falls and with lower flow in the river the dilution capacity of the system 
is compromised. According to Coetzee (2006) the main problem in the Loskop 
Dam is the effluent leak from old disused mines.  
 
Mines act as a collector of groundwater. The catchment surface is fractured 
from mining, runoff decreases and water is drained into underground 
aquifers, and then seeps into streams (Lodewijks, 2006). The Klein Olifants 
River is an example of pollution by contaminated underground water that 
originates from mines. Mines pollute water due to the reaction of water with 
minerals. During the wet period in 1995/6 many mines filled up with water, 
and started spilling. Desalination plants had to be built because coalmines 
need to get rid of this water. The quality of the water originating from 
coalmines is a critical factor (Lodewijks, 2006) while mines near Witbank are 
accused of polluting the underground water (Pretorius, 2006).  
 
Water quality affects agricultural crops such as tobacco and citrus negatively 
in the Loskop area (Pretorius, 2006). This has a negative impact on export of Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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some agricultural products that are chemically tested. Prinsloo (2006) also 
considers algae a problem in this area as filters are clogged.  
 
2.   Economic theoretical considerations 
 
It is suggested in this contribution that economic measures may be used to 
complement the Controlled Release Scheme of DWAF. Two economic policies 
are suggested, namely transferable pollution permits and environmental 
offsets. Transferable pollution permits are a well known mechanism but the 
problem is that the pollution market in catchments differs from the traditional 
pollution markets and that rules and safeguards need to be adopted. DWAF so 
far had concerns with transferable pollution permits but it will be shown that 
these concerns can be incorporated in the rules of the program. Environmental 
offsets are also well known in wetland conservation but so far this is a 
relatively unknown tool in river management. As these techniques are 
suggested in the recommendations, some theoretical considerations are given.  
  
2.1   A separate instrument is needed for each policy goal  
 
Young and McColl (2005) adopt the Tinberger Principle namely that a separate 
instrument be used for each policy goal. While a market in water trades 
promotes efficiency in water use it is not designed to improve other bio-
diversity objectives such as water quality. Specific approaches will be 
discussed to reduce pollution or promote bio-diversity in the spirit of this 
Principle.  
 
2.2   The  isolation  paradox explains the need for institutions in off-set 
arrangements 
 
In order to justify the creation of institutions to deal with biodiversity 
problems it is important to understand why institutions are needed. 
Economists have traditionally diagnosed environmental problems as market 
failures. The markets do not transmit appropriate incentives needed to achieve 
efficiency. Some have called for government to tax or regulate externalities. 
Others have argued that allocative inefficiency is caused by incomplete 
property rights and therefore privatization is the appropriate policy response. 
The latter group contend that government failure is more pervasive. The 
merits of these approaches will not be debated here. 
 
The insistence on individual action or none at all can leave every one isolated 
and ineffective (Randall & Taylor, 2000). This class of issues are called 
isolation paradoxes. Some economists contend that the law has evolved over 
time to deal with the isolation paradox problem without government Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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interference (Pasour, 1990). Examples are downstream fishermen in England 
formed an association and have taken upstream polluters to task while class 
action court cases in the USA are common in environmental pollution. For 
instance citizens of LA have claimed compensation from air polluters in a class 
action court case. No single citizen in LA may have enough funds to take the 
polluter(s) to court and even if the person has the funds he/she does not have 
the incentive as others will free ride on the outcome. 
 
American law therefore created the institution of class action cases through 
which many victims can enlist and take offenders to court. This example also 
explains the scale effect that a large amount of money is involved. The cost to 
upgrade a river may be significant as it may do little good to only improve a 
small section of the river. A river can o n l y  b e  u p g r a d e d  i f  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
number of independent land owners can be encouraged to cooperate with 
each other and with public land agencies. For many kinds of ecosystems 
(wetlands and rivers), protection of biodiversity requires large areas of 
contiguous habitat. This is the classic isolation paradox (Randall & Taylor, 
2000).  
 
The creation of bio-diversity offsets for a river creates the incentive for 
cooperation amongst stakeholders which may be mines, developers, 
environmental groups, farmers and public land agencies. Supporting 
institutions need to be created to facilitate cooperation. Situations are often 
unique but it is proposed that opportunities for enhancing the environment be 
sought through a partnership between government and stakeholders.  
 
3.   Some market related policies which may impact on the environment 
in catchments  
 
3.1   Water trades and the environment  
 
Water trading may have benefits for the environment for instance trades from 
upstream to downstream improve stream flow. That is a person upstream sells 
his water rights and stops irrigation. Both the quality and quantity of water 
are important for bio-diversity. Both these dimensions may improve with 
trade as the farmer upstream stops applying fertiliser while the greater stream 
flow has a dilution effect. Trades in the opposite direction will have a negative 
effect on the environment and are not approved in the Western USA and 
South Africa should follow the same approach. All the water trades so far 
observed in South Africa are from up to down stream (Boegoeberg to 
Kakamas along the Orange River and from above the gorge to below the gorge 
along the Crocodile River) but as these trades were from non-users (non 
irrigators who own water use entitlement) to users (farmers near the river Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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without sufficient water) there was no environmental impact. At present 
(2008), there is opposition to trade of non-exercised user rights in the Berg 
River and Crocodile River. When trade takes place between users (irrigators) 
in future the positive environmental impacts will be as discussed above. There 
are salination problems in the Lower Berg River and some suggested that 
trading from down to up in this river should be considered.  
 
Although trading may have environmental impacts as discussed, water 
trading promotes efficiency in water use and does not have a specific 
environmental objective. Negative impacts on the environment are avoided by 
the legal protection of the Reserve in the National Water Act of 1998 and by 
authorities through licenses.  
 
3.2   Environmental fund 
 
If an environmental fund is established then water in rivers may be purchased 
for this purpose. Several rivers in South Africa are in deficit (not sufficient 
water is provided for the Ecological Reserve) at present such as the Crocodile 
(East) and the Olifants River (East). The Ecological Reserve is protected by law 
but as these rivers are under stress it is a challenging task to reconcile water 
demand with available water without reducing water allocated to current 
users. It has been suggested by Van Niekerk (2006) that a fund be created 
which can be used to buy out water rights. The fund could be used to 
influence both the quantity and quality of water. Water rights may be 
purchased from farmers in areas where irrigation leads to salination (for 
instance in the Great Fish River) or where water quality is adversely affected 
by fertilization. 
  
A possible source for such a fund may be tax on water used by farmers and 
the forestry sector (financed through catchment management charges). The 
fund could be financed through the selling of “biodiversity credits” on either a 
national and/or international scale. Politicians and businesses may benefit 
from a positive attitude to the environment as it may mean votes and also 
profits for instance the cover of Newsweek (2006) reads, “Going Green How 
Big Business Learned to Love the Environment”. 
 
A lucrative source for funding in South Africa is rural property developers 
and possibly mines who want to improve their social image. It may be 
possible if these users of the environment make contributions to such a fund 
that this gesture will improve their chances when they apply for concessions 
to expand. Often these developers do not pay for concessions which are worth 
a significant monetary value and which entail a transfer of wealth from society Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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to developers. If environmental rents are extracted by developers then these 
contributions will not be a tax on new investment and not be a disincentive to 
create jobs. Connor and Young (2003) propose that these contributions be tax 
deductible (as other donations to worthy causes) in order to provide added 
incentive to contributors.  
  
If a fund is set up for biodiversity purposes, safeguards need to be put in place 
that this money is used for biodiversity purposes, and not for other objectives. 
Preferably the fund should be administered by a non profit organization (De 
Wit, 2006). 
 
3.3   Transferable pollution permits 
 
The optimum discharge tax is conceptually indicated by the intersection of 
two functions. The first function shows as more is polluted the marginal cost 
of damage increases (marginal cost of one additional unit of pollution 
released). The second function shows that as more pollution is eliminated the 
marginal cost of elimination increases (marginal cost of one additional unit of 
pollution controlled) (Lodewijks, 2002). Marginal cost functions are 
opportunity cost functions which are by definition subjective and not 
observable. It is thus not possible to calculate an optimum discharge tax using 
econometric tools to a high degree of accuracy. The optimum discharge tax 
will also vary along the river as is the case with water prices in different water 
markets along a river, making estimation of the optimum tax impossible. It is 
thus suggested that a pollution trading market be created to discover the rent 
of the pollution permit.  
 
3.4   Wetland offsets can reduce pollution in a river 
 
The concept of wetland offsets will be introduced briefly to show that this 
arrangement has a scientific foundation and that it could be adopted to 
provide incentives to stakeholders to reduce pollution in the Olifants River 
Catchment. A market for bio-diversity credits has developed in 20 states in the 
USA where wetlands have been constructed by some developers who then sell 
an offset right to others who want to drain wetlands (Randall & Taylor, 2000).  
 
There are two approaches at the centre of offset management namely 
ecological proxies (area or habitat function) or the use of economic values of 
bio-diversity. Bio-diversity has no market value but a technique such as 
willingness to pay (WTP) has been used to impute a monetary value to such a 
good. In some instances such as the eradication of alien vegetation it may be 
easier to attach a monetary value (opportunity cost of the Government doing 
it). Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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In South Africa biodiversity offsets have been proposed by the Institute of 
National Resources (INR) (Dickens, 2006) and in the Western Cape (De Wit, 
2006). De Wit (2006) provides guidelines for a framework wherein offsets can 
be recommended. Bio-diversity offsets do not replace the responsibility to 
make onsite offsets. Bio-diversity offsets are conservative actions to 
compensate for the residual unavoidable harm to bio-diversity caused by 
development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of bio-diversity. For more 
information on these trading schemes the reader is referred to Randall and 
Taylor (2000), Bjornlund (2003), De Wit (2006) and Dickens (2006). 
 
In this contribution the concept of biodiversity offsets as applied to wetlands is 
further explored in streams. In the latter cases the approach was to expand the 
offset beyond water and to include land in the riparian zone (which also 
results directly in biodiversity protection). Land and water users who adopt 
sustainable best management p r a c t i c e s  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  e a r n  b i o d i v e r s i t y  
credits in this way.  
 
Incentives may be provided through markets to stakeholders to improve 
biodiversity in streams. It is suggested that credits be earned if rivers are 
upgraded from say a D to an A river. It is up to responsible authorities to 
decide how many credits can be earned by improving the classification of a 
river reach. It is envisaged that would be investors in a river banking scheme 
will propose to upgrade a river. These investors will look at rivers where they 
can make the biggest improvement for a given outlay. Authorities should also 
guide investors in terms of rivers where biodiversity is threatened. An off-
setting arrangement from river to river may also be considered, whereby users 
who want to degrade the class in a river have to off-set the degradation by 
increasing the class of another river by the same magnitude or using a 
mitigation ratio.  
 
It is further suggested that these credits be convertible to wetland credits. In 
wetland offsets the currency used to make offsets is the size of land involved 
(Randall & Taylor, 2000). In a river offset system the water surface area (and 
riparian zone) that is improved may be considered for trading. The fact that 
surface area in a river (which may include the riparian zone) is different from 
the surface area in a wetland will be accounted for by a different exchange rate 
(conversion factor). A different mitigation ratio may be applied as for 
wetlands or it may be decided that such a ratio may not be relevant to rivers. 
 
In this contribution the mitigation offset system applied to wetlands is also 
suggested for rivers while exchange rates (conversion rates) may be used by 
the responsible authorities in order to link these markets. It will be up to Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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entrepreneurs to improve the classification of a river or a section in a river. 
This may involve buying out farmers in a highly sensitive area, improving 
water quality, improving habitat services, storm water mitigation etc. as 
prescribed by the relevant authorities. The concept of “no net loss” to 
biodiversity may thus be applied to biodiversity in wetlands and rivers 
bringing all together in one market. In the above approach it is assumed that 
polluters to the stream are fined in accordance with damages and that they do 
not earn credits from reducing pollution.  
 
It is suggested that current efforts to promote bio-diversity in wetlands be 
supported by efforts to enhance it in rivers. It should be considered that 
market approaches used to promote wetland bio-diversity be linked to 
proposed efforts in rivers. 
 
4.  Tradable pollution permits and the Controlled Release Scheme in the 
Olifants River (East)  
 
The current approach to reduce pollution in the Olifants River is the 
“Controlled Release Scheme”. Markets can also be used to provide incentives 
to stakeholders to reduce pollution. Various options are available that can be 
used in a complementary fashion. These will be discussed. 
  
4.1   Controlled release scheme  
 
Presently pollution levels from mines can be brought to the required level by 
using the assimilative capacity of streams/rivers. A “controlled release 
scheme” is currently in place that controls the releases of effluent into rivers 
and dams. During high flow periods, when the assimilative capacity of the 
system is high, discharges are possible. Golder Africa Associates monitors the 
discharge scheme. Although this discharge system is the cheaper method, 
during low river flow sufficient dilution of salts (pollutants) is not possible. If 
the mines had not put in a desalination plant, they would not have been able 
to continue with operations as no discharge was possible during the recent 
period up to 2006 of low flow of the Olifants River (Lodewijks, 2006). 
 
During high stream flow the release of pollutants may not exceed required 
quality levels but during low flows, assimilative capacity will be too low to 
absorb pollutants. The challenge of this approach would be the low flow 
periods that can be of a long duration in South Africa. For instance, during the 
period 2001 to 2006 it was too dry to release any pollutants into the Olifants 
Catchment (Lodewijks, 2006). It is an open question whether buying water use 
entitlements from agriculture and/or transfers from other catchments can be Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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used to increase the assimilative capacity of streams in dry periods. The cost 
and availability of sufficient water at the required time may cause such an 
approach non-viable. 
 
4.2   Discharge taxes 
 
In terms of Chapter 3 of the National Water Act (NWA) No. 36, the water 
needs for the effective functioning of aquatic ecosystems must be protected. 
Ecological sustainability refers to water (quantity and quality) required to 
protect the aquatic ecosystems of the water resources and ensure their 
sustainability. Waste is defined in terms of Section 1 (1) (xxiii) of the NWA. 
The calculation of charges will be based on the registered discharge waste load 
of salinity and phosphorus, as representing the two most widespread water 
quality problems in South Africa. The salt load will be estimated using 
electrical conductivity. Phosphorus (as the limiting nutrient for freshwater 
eutrophication) will be estimated using soluble phosphorus (phosphate) 
(DWAF, 2006).  
 
DWAF is developing a Waste Discharge Charge System aimed at incentivising 
polluters to reduce discharge levels. This “polluter pays principle” should 
become operative in 2008 (Havenga, 2006). This system will distinguish 
between point and non-point sources. At present, discharges in the Olifants 
Catchment are not taxed. It is recommended that polluters should pay a 
discharge tax which must be enforced as they use water from the river in a 
similar way as abstracting users of water who pay water rates. 
 
4.3   Tradable discharge permits 
 
In a permit discharge-trading market the market price of permits will be 
determined by the intersection of two marginal cost functions (marginal cost 
of one additional unit of pollution released and marginal cost of one 
additional unit of pollution controlled). In a water market the market 
discovers the optimum price of water and participants in the market face the 
opportunity cost of this price. It is recommended that the same principle 
should be followed in discharges of pollution and that the optimum price be 
discovered in a pollution trading market. If polluter s  a l s o  h a v e  t o  p a y  a  
discharge tax then this tax will reduce the market price. 
 
Lodewijks (2002) recommended a discharge permit trading system but the 
f o l l o w i n g  p r o b l e m s  h a v e  b e e n  r a i s e d  b y  D W A F  a n d  o t h e r s  a t  t h e  t i m e  
(Lodewijks, 2006). Discharges are only possible when river flow is sufficient, 
while the following must be considered; spatial location of mines relative to Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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one another, and the river network which will drain the effluent into the dams. 
DWAF had concerns about trading monopolies and that it may affect small 
stakeholders negatively.  
 
It is important that DWAF’s concerns and other concerns be considered and 
possibly be incorporated as potential recommended rules of such a trading 
program. All markets have rules, for instance the Stock Exchange has opening 
and closing hours. A market for discharge permits will also have rules. As 
pollutants can only be discharged in rivers during high flow times, it is 
important that this rule be adopted in a permit-trading program. 
 
Another rule in a permit-trading program may be that trade may only take 
place within well-defined reaches of the river. A water market has similar 
constraints to minimise externalities. In a water market, trade can only take 
p l a c e  f r o m  u p  s t r e a m  t o  d o w n  s t r e a m  w h i l e  i n  a  p o l l u t i o n  p e r m i t  t r a d i n g  
program, trade should go the other way as down stream trade increases the 
concentration of the pollutant at a down stream point. 
 
The Olifants River Forum Stakeholder Workshop near Witbank was attended 
during 2006 (for list of stakeholders see Olifants River Forum, 2006). Gunter 
(2006), one of the representatives of the mines who participated, indicated that 
mines are definitely interested in tradable discharge permits but thought that 
it may not be possible in future to obtain them from DWAF. The alternative of 
building desalination plants is expensive. The cost of the plant near Witbank 
visited is about R300 million (US$ 42 million) (Gunter, 2006). Not all this cost 
is fixed as the reservoir where the pollutants solidify, fill up after 15 years after 
which time a new site must be established and the old one is thus abandoned. 
Variable costs can be saved using discharges and the mines prefer this 
method. 
 
The rule that discharge is only permitted during high flow is also adopted in 
the Hunter River Salinity Trading Program in Australia (HRSTS, undated). 
Reason for the adoption of the Australian program is because of conflict 
between primary producers (livestock and irrigation farmers) and mining. 
Credits in the Australian program are initially allocated free to license holders 
based on environmental performance. Two hundred credits are auctioned 
every two years to replace those retired. New credits have a lifespan of 10 
years and a total of 1000 credits are permitted. Auction proceeds are used to 
pay scheme operating cost (environmental and compliance monitoring cost). 
Targets are set at 900 microsiemens/cm but it may vary along reaches. 
Options for industry are to purchase more credits and/or to implement 
cleaner technologies. Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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5.   Environmental offsets  
 
5.1   Offsets can provide incentives to reduce pollution in a river 
 
According to Coetzee (2006) the pollution in the Loskop Dam in the Olifants 
River is serious. He further is of the opinion that the main source is the leakage 
from abandoned old mines (pre-1956) during low flow periods. DWAF has 
accepted ownership of these abandoned mines. Before the promulgation of 
Water Act of 1956 an agreement was reached between DWAF and the 
Chamber of Mines that the liabilities with respect to water pollution of all 
mines that had ceased production before 1956 would lie with DWAF 
(Lodewijks, 2002:36, 37). 
 
In an offsetting arrangement, incentives can be provided to existing mines to 
desalinate these defunct mines and in return the existing mines could be 
provided a concession to discharge a given amount in the Olifants River when 
the water flow is sufficiently high.  
 
The problem with the defunct mines is that they leak pollutants all the time 
including during the period when river flow is low. The negative 
environmental impact is reduced with this off-set arrangement as the pollution 
during low flow periods is reduced and pollutant is discharged when flow is 
sufficiently high. Lodewijks (2006) supports such an approach. Other offsets 
may be considered as the researcher can not be prescriptive regarding which 
offset to use as the arrangement must be attractive to parties concerned (mines 
and DWAF). The mines have the technology to desalinate polluted water and 
have already invested hundreds of millions Rand in this. DWAF may not have 
the technology while a major part of the significant investment is of a fixed 
nature. The above arrangement will cost the taxpayer nothing and will 
promote a more desirable outcome.  
 
5.2   Offsets to mitigate negative environmental impacts of dams 
 
The promotion of water markets in South Africa will reduce the pressure on 
the construction of new dams. However, the demand for increased storable 
water is great in South Africa due to increased urbanization and demand from 
the mining sector. For instance, it is estimated that urban demand will double 
in the Lower Olifants River Catchment during the next decade (McCartney et 
al., 2004). South Africa has a fast growing urban population which is entirely 
different from countries such as the USA and Australia as well as Europe. 
Environmentalists in these countries are concerned about the environmental 
impact of dams. 
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It appears that in China where urbanisation is also high, dams are being built 
often over-riding local opposition. This conclusion is drawn from TV coverage 
of the alleged one million people displaced by the building of the Three 
Gorges Dam in China and from a personal visit to China. It is suggested if 
dams are contemplated in South Africa and if impacts are negative in sensitive 
ecological areas that offsets be considered to mitigate negative environmental 
impacts. It may be possible to negotiate with the builders of a dam to eradicate 
alien vegetation over a stretch in the river or to make other offsets in return for 
waiving opposition to the construction. If offsets are seen to have scientific 
international foundation then it is possible to strengthen their institutions and 
to inform stakeholders that such arrangements are possible. If stakeholders are 
not aware that these offsets are possible then many developments may not 
take place because of the opposition to such developments. 
 
Several (potential) offsets in rivers in South Africa will be discussed. Two of 
the offsets are in the Olifants River Catchment (De Hoop Dam and Flag 
Boshielo Dam), while the agreement between the builders of a dam and 
environmentalists in KwaZulu-Natal can be seen as an offset arrangement. It 
appears as if these arrangements have taken place in a voluntary bargaining 
way between stakeholders.  
 
(a) De Hoop Dam located on the Steelpoort River 
The building of a dam in the Steelpoort River namely the De Hoop Dam has 
been approved subject to a final environmental audit (Havenga, 2006). The 
Kruger National Park has been opposed to the building of the dam initially. 
Management in the Kruger National Park now seems more supportive of the 
project given that the dam may play a role in augmenting flows particularly in 
dry periods. Gyedu-Ababio (2006) indicated that the Kruger National Park 
might waive concerns about the building of the De Hoop Dam in the 
Steelpoort River if the Park gets an allocation (say 5%) of the dam’s capacity. 
This is not an official offer and it is not known whether it is intended as a 
serious statement but as a potential off-set such an arrangement should be 
pursued. 
 
(b) Flag Boshielo Dam 
Raising of the wall of the Flag Boshielo Dam increases yield by 18 million 
cubic meters but eight farms were inundated as a result. As part of an off-set 
the canal infrastructure of Previous Disadvantage Individual (PDI) farmers 
downstream of the dam is being upgraded as part of the deal. 
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(c) Newcastle Dam  
Wetland offsets have similar ingredients to the offsetting arrangement in the 
construction of a dam in Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal. The town of Newcastle 
in KwaZulu-Natal is building a dam for drinking water. It has been 
established that 18 ha will be damaged (flooded) by construction of the dam. 
In exchange for flooding 18 ha of a provincial reserve, the proponent 
purchased more than 1000 ha of the catchment area and set aside funds to 
manage the remaining area to control invasive plants. The 1000 ha will be 
handed over to KZN wildlife for conservation (De Wit, 2006). 
 
(d) Boulder Creek, Colorado 
  I n  t h e  B o u l d e r  C r e e k ,  p r o j e c t s  w e r e  f u n d e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  s t r e a m  f l o w  a s  i t  
increased the capacity of the stream for ammonia (Randall & Taylor, 2000). 
One source of the ammonia pollution was livestock and in the offsetting 
arrangement farmers were paid to fence livestock in the riparian zone. 
 
5.3   Privatising the eradication of alien vegetation and offsets of wetlands  
 
Mines have bio-diversity action plans in the Olifants River Catchment, for 
instance a wetlands mitigation program is used whereby a previously 
destroyed wetland can be rehabilitated in exchange for a concession elsewhere 
(Lodewijks, 2006). Mines intend to eradicate 2500 ha of alien vegetation that 
will yield 5 million cubic meters of water at a cost of R24.4 million or R4.9 per 
cubic meter. This appears to be the cheapest (best value) option for harvesting 
water (Rossouw, 2006). There are other plans to obtain 13 million cubic meters 
of water from eradicating alien vegetation at a cost of R117 million (Rossouw, 
2006). These private ventures should be e n c o u r a g e d  a s  t h e y  h a v e  p o s i t i v e  
social spin-offs.  
  
A major environmental problem in rivers is that alien vegetation is a 
significant consumptive use of water. Alien vegetation is currently been 
eradicated under the Government’s Working for Water (WfW) Programme. 
Alien vegetation is a major problem for instance in the highly stressed Lower 
Crocodile it is officially estimated that alien vegetation uses more water than 
the significant forestry sector in this basin (DWAF, 2004). Currently R50 
million is spent annually in this Province for the eradication of this 
consumptive use which is insufficient (Comrie, 2006). An offsetting 
arrangement may be considered to provide incentives to private entrepreneurs 
to undertake this where state funding is clearly inadequate. 
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6.  Water quality in the Berg River and the isolation paradox 
 
Myburgh (2007) states that two years ago pollution levels in the Berg River 
were five to 24 times the EU’s permitted maximum for food production. The 
key is to stop polluted matter from entering the river. This would necessitate 
cleaning up river banks, providing better sanitation for informal settlements 
and controlling the discharge of waste water from municipalities, wineries, 
intensive farms and industry (Myburgh, 2007). This would require a combined 
effort from the municipalities, the Province, the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry and industry. Heavy winter rains in 2007 have flushed out the 
river system giving some breathing space. South Africa’s export competitors in 
the EU and USA have an incentive to cast doubt about the quality of South 
African fruit exports and it is instructive to bear in mind the massive recalls of 
Chinese products that failed to meet stringent health standards in their 
respective export markets. Farmers on the other hand are required to adhere 
to high quality standards, as rejection is possible for relative minor quality 
problems. 
 
According to the Regional DWAF Office, part of the reason for this situation is 
that insufficient funds are made available to local governments to upgrade 
waste treatment facilities of municipalities. Water quality standards are 
monitored but DWAF cannot easily institute legal proceedings against another 
state agency. There is, however, currently a program underway to improve the 
quality of the Berg River and different role players are involved. There is 
pressure on municipalities and outcry from politicians. Developers have even 
promised financial assistance. 
 
The DWAF is currently converting Irrigation Boards to Water Users 
Associations in catchments in South Africa. There appears no opposition to 
such a change in the Berg River from leading farmers visited during 2008. This 
conversion of the Berg River Irrigation Board to a Water User Association will 
bring in all stakeholders in one body and will assist in dealing with the 
pollution problems in the Berg River. Such a change is also in the spirit of the 
Isolation Paradox that supporting institutions need to be created to facilitate 
cooperation where all stake holders are represented. Role players have 
voluntary formed an association to deal with problems of common interest as 
in the Berg River but this may not always be the case and government may 
insist in providing institutions as in the case of water markets.  
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7.   Concluding comments 
 
Economists have traditionally diagnosed environmental problems as market 
failures and some have called for government to tax externalities while others 
h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  i n e f f i c i e n c y  i s  c a u s e d  b y  i n c o m p l e t e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  a n d  
therefore privatization is the appropriate policy response. The latter group 
contend that government failure is more pervasive. The insistence on 
individual action or none at all can leave every one isolated and ineffective 
(isolation paradox) and institutions need to be created.  
 
Institutions can be created in off-setting arrangements. Such an offsetting 
arrangement is discussed that can reduce pollution from abandoned old mines 
(pre-1956) during low flow periods in the Loskop Dam. In such an offsetting 
arrangement incentives can be provided to existing mines to desalinate these 
defunct mines and in return the existing mines could be provided a concession 
to discharge a given amount in the Olifants River when the water flow is 
sufficiently high. The problem with the defunct mines is that they leak 
pollutants all the time including during the period when river flow is low. The 
negative environmental impact is reduced with this off-set arrangement as the 
pollution during low flow periods is reduced and pollutant is discharged 
when flow is sufficiently high. Stakeholders in the Olifants River Forum 
supported such an approach. 
 
In the USA formal markets have developed with trades (buyers and sellers) in 
trade-offs in wetlands with conversion rates. In this paper opportunities for 
specific trade-offs were proposed in a catchment. Trades proposed in this 
contribution are more site specific and it is not proposed that the good to be 
traded be converted to a good traded in another area through a conversion 
rate as in wetlands in the USA. However, innovative trades with conversion 
factors should be pursued – also in catchments – if they are supported by 
environmental groups.  
 
If stakeholders are not aware that offsets are possible then many 
developments may not take place because of the opposition to such 
developments. The environment is often adversely affected by the building of 
dams and offsets can be used to mitigate these effects. Several case studies 
were discussed in this regard in this paper.  
 
A discharge permit trading system was also proposed in the Olifants River. 
Amongst the rules that must be adopted in such a trading program is that 
discharges are only possible when river flow is sufficient. All markets are 
regulated and the concern of DWAF about such programmes could be Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Nieuwoudt 
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included as parameters within which such a programme should operate. The 
more constraints that are being placed on such a market the less “efficient” it 
will be so there is a trade-off between protection of some issues and flexibility 
of the market. 
 
The Tinberger Principle is adopted in this paper namely that a separate 
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